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Farmer: Legal, Economic and Policy Aspects of Wage Stabilizations

LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLICY ASPECTS OF
WAGE STABILIZATION*
Guy Farmer"
I. THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BASIS FOR WAGE STABILIZATION

W

AGE stabilization is a touchy subject, particularly with
employees and labor unions. It is easy enough to see why
this is so. Whenever you tell a working man that the law will
not permit him to have a wage or salary increase, which he feels
that he both deserves and needs, you can expect to encounter
strong opposition and even bitterness. This puts a heavy burden
indeed on labor organizations who have been expected not only
to go along with but also to participate in the government
machinery for enforcing wage ceilings.
I can certainly sympathize with the feeling of the working
man on this subject. His adverse reaction to wage control is a
factor to be recognized. But, the average working man does not
understand, and can hardly be expected to understand, the economics of the situation and the relationship which exists between
wages and prices. The fact is-as every student of the most
elementary economics knows-prices, in a freely rising economy,
will always stay ahead of wages, and the superficial advantages
which employees obtain from wage increases during an inflationary period are completely illusionary.
It has been proved by experience during World War II that
it is impossible to control prices if wages are uncontrolled. What
happens is wage increases bring continually increased pressure to
bear on price ceilings until the price ceilings are eventually
broken and labor's gains in wages are more than wiped out by a
disproportionate rise in the cost of living.
Therefore, as much as it hurts, wage stabilization is inescapable
if we are going to stabilize prices at any reasonable level and halt
the upward spiral in the cost of living.
Make no mistake about it, inflation is not just a future
threat; it is a present calamity. Unless it is halted, we could
quickly reach the stage where a working man could carry his
wages home in a gunny sack and still not have enough to buy
bread for himself and his family.
OAddress delivered at the Conference on Labor Relations in a Mobilized
Economy, held at West Virginia University on April 13 and 14, 1951.
"Member

of the Washington, D.C., bar.
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Taking the period 1935-1939 as the base, the cost of living
for all items combined has risen from 100 to 181.5 as of January
15, 1951. In other words, the cost of living has almost doubled.
What is even more alarming, approximately 50 points of this
increase have accrued since June 15, 1946 when the index stood
at 133.3.
Wages can never hope to keep abreast of such a spectacular
rise in the cost of living, particularly if we think in terms of takehome pay, since individual taxes have also increased many-fold
since the 1933-1939 period.
In short, labor always loses in the race between wages and
prices, and it is labor, including the middle class, salaried worker
which stands to profit most from price control coupled with wage
stabilization. After all, it is not the dollar amount of earnings
but purchasing power in terms of commodities and services which
determine the real value of a man's earnings.
Such is the economic reason for wage control. The legal
basis appears in the Defense Production Act of 1950. Title IV
of this act deals with price and wage stabilization. It specifically
ties wages in with prices and makes it mandatory for wages to be
stabilized whenever price ceilings are established. This works
either in the case where a price ceiling is placed on a particular
industry or business or where price ceilings are imposed generally.
In other words, the law requires that price and wage control go
hand in hand.
The law does not, however, require that wages be completely
frozen. It simply requires that they be "stabilized", and this
term "stabilize" suggests that Congress intended that, whenever
prices are controlled, wages should likewise be controlled at some
level bearing a fair and reasonable relationship to prices and to
the over-all cost of living. The responsibility for carrying out
this critical and difficult task is placed on the President of the
United States, but the President is empowered to delegate the
job to exisiting agencies or such new agencies as he may establish.
As we shall see, the President has made that delegation.
II.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAGE STABILIZATION BoARm

The Wage Stabilization Board was established by Executive
Order (No. 10161) on September 12, 1950. The same order provided for the creation of the Office of Price Stabilization. The
executive order provided for a single director of price stabilization,
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but, on the wage side, it provided for a tripartite board, composed of three public, three industry and three labor members.
Both the price director and the wage board are subject to the
supervision and direction of the Economic Stabilization Agency,
which is now headed by Eric Johnston. The ESA is in turn
responsible to the Office of Defense Mobilization which reports
to the President.
It was necessary to coordinate through some over-all agency
the activities of the price administrator and the wage board,
since the Defense Production Act clearly ties wages and prices
together and contemplates a coordinated and interrelated program.
III.

SCOPE

OF WAGE REGULATIONS AND PENALTIES

There has been considerable confusion in the public mind
as to the nature and scope of the wage regulations. For example,
Stan Musial, the slugging outfielder of the St. Louis Cardinals,
seems to have been flabbergasted to learn that the regulations
apply to him and prevent him from taking advantage of a very
substantial raise.
The fact is that the coverage of the regulations is extremely
broad. The original freeze regulation, issued on January 26,
applies to every person in every business or activity in the entire
country who works for an hourly wage, on a piece rate, or on a
salary or commission. It applies to bank presidents, janitors,
grocery clerks, salesmen, laundry truck drivers, and every one else.
Doctors and lawyers and teachers are covered if they work for a
salary. However, fees charged for professional services are exempted
by a specific provision of the Defense Production Act. A few
others have since been exempted by regulation. These exemptions
are strictly limited, affecting only employees of state and local
governments and employees of charitable, religious and educational
institutions. However, even as to these exemptions, the regulations state that, although exempt, these institutions are expected
to conform to the wage stabilization policies announced by the
board, and the board has reserved the right to review any wage or
salary adjustments made to these groups and revoke the exemption
at any time without prior notice.
It may be interesting to glance briefly at the penalties which
may be incurred for violation of the regulations.
In the first place, it should be kept in mind that a person
who receives a wage or salary increase in contravention of the
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regulations is as guilty as the person who pays it. In the event
of violations, the violator becomes subject to a criminal penalty,
involving a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both. Also, the President can by regulation provide
various other penalties, such as taking away the privilege of
deducting illegal wage payments for tax purposes. In World War
II this was done, and the regulation went so far as to provide
that the entire amount of the wages paid, not just the illegal
excess, should be disregarded as a business expense for tax purposes. No similar regulation has yet been issued under the present
statute.
In addition to these penalties, the board has the power by
delegation from the President, to go into court and enjoin
violations of the regulations.
Insofar as I know, there have as yet been no convictions and
no injunctions issued against violators of the wage regulations,
although there is no doubt that many violations, some innocent
and some intentional, have occurred. This is because the board
is not now functioning as I will later point out, and also because
the organization is new and has not yet been staffed sufficiently
to pursue any kind of a vigorous enforcement policy. But, no
doubt it will come, and we may expect more and more vigorous
enforcement as time goes on.
IV.

THE HISTORY OF THE WAGE STABILIZATION BOARD

The Wage Stabilization Board has had an interesting and
siormy history. It was provided for by Executive Order on September 12, 1950, but the members of the board were not actually
appointed until October 10. Its labor members resigned in a
body on February 15, 1951, and it has not since been reconstituted.
Therefore, it was in operation as a board for less than four
months, and, in actual fact, it has never truly functioned. Whatever wage stabilization has been achieved has been accomplished
around and in spite of the board, rather than through its operation.
At this very moment, frenzied efforts are being made to
reconstitute the board, and the behind-the-scenes maneuvering,
so typical of the Washington scene, is at its height. This is indeed
a critical moment, and decisions are being reached which will be
far-reaching in their consequences. It is, therefore, an appropriate
time to examine the history of the board, evaluate its prior
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activities and attempt to forecast something of its future and the
future of wage stabilization.
As has been seen, the decision to establish a single administrator for price control and a tripartite board for wage control
was made by the President and not by Congress.
This decision was, in my opinion, responsible in large part
for the failure of the board. The theory that problems involving
labor should be handled by a board composed of equal numbers
of labor, management and public members has taken firm root
in the thinking of our government, and where labor disputes are
involved, it certainly has merit. Such was the composition of
the War Labor Board in World War II. However, where the
need is for the establishment and enforcement of an effective
program of wage control, such a setup was doomed to failure
from the outset. Asking labor and management to administer
wage controls is very much like expecting effective price control
from a board whose majority membership is composed of wholesalers and retailers.
It is only necessary to take a look at the record of the Wage
Stabilization Board to discover how pitifully ineffective it has
been. The board did not start to function until January 1951.
When the general price freeze was issued on January 26, the
Defense Production Act made it mandatory for the wage board
to stabilize wages. This was the first test for the tripartite board,
and the board flunked it completely. The board could not agree
on a wage freeze, and, therefore, the first freeze order of January 26
was issued, not by the board, but by Johnston, the economic
stabilizer.
The first wage order of any significance issued by the board
was General Wage Regulation 2, issued on January 30, 1951. This
was not a wage freeze or a tightening of the freeze. Rather, it
was a liberalization of the freeze to validate increases agreed to
but not put into effect prior to January 25. This regulation was
issued by the public and labor members, with the industry
members filing a strong dissent.
After this liberalization, nothing of significance was done by
the board, while it argued and fought over a wage formula to be
substituted for the freeze order of January 26. On February 12,
Regulation 5 was issued, permitting merit and length of service
increases to be made, and, although this was again a liberalization,
the labor members dissented because they believed the board
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should order employers to open up their payroll records to labor
unions.
Meanwhile, the internal fight over the wage formula, which
eventually was embodied in Regulation 6, continued to rage, and
rumors were rife in Washington that the dispute centered on
escalator clauses and on the percentage of increase allowablewhether six per cent, eight per cent, ten per cent, or twelve
per cent.
However, the board was never able to agree on a formula.
On February 15, Regulation 6, providing for a ten per cent increase over January 1950 wage and salary levels, was issued by
the board, not as an order but simply as a recommendation to
Johnston, and, thereafter, on February 15, the labor members
resigned from the board and labor staged its dramatic walkout
from the entire mobilization program.
Since then wage stabilization has been in the lap of Johnston
who has handled it for all the world like the hot potato it assuredly
has proven itself to be. The only other thing of any significance
which Johnston has done since the demise of the board was to
issue Regulation 8, on March 8, validating escalator or cost-of-living
clauses incorporated in contracts which were in effect prior to
January 25, 1951.
V.

PROPOSALS FOR RECONSTITUTING BOARD

It would be foolhardy to attempt to evaluate all of the factors
which motivated the walkout of labor. Obviously, their discontent
was not with wage stabilization alone but with price control and
the entire mobilization program. The walkout was a power play
to dramatize their dissatisfaction and to put pressure on the
administration to give them a full partnership in the government.
In part, also, it was a personal slap at Wilson, whom they dislike
and perhaps would like to force out of his top mobilization job.
The walkout of labor gave the administration an opportunity
to start afresh, and abolish the tripartite setup, which had failed
so dismally, and appoint a wage administrator. But this was not
done, and apparently will not be done. Instead, Johnston's office
has attempted and is still attempting to bring labor back in the
fold and reestablish a three-headed board. From all reports, it
appears that he is willing to go a long way to satisfy the labor
group. The chief bone of contention seems to revolve around
the question of whether or not the board will be given power to
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adjudicate disputes- including both wage disputes and nonmonetary issues, such as union security, check off, arbitration,
jurisdictional disputes, management functions, operating procedures, seniority and other matters.
Labor is holding out for vastly enlarging the powers of the
board and reports are that Johnston has given in in large part
to their demands, and is now seeking industry approval. So far,
this has not been forthcoming. My own view is that, granting
the board the authority to settle wage disputes and labor disputes
generally would be a serious, almost a tragic, error. It would
be just as unfortunate-perhaps more so-for labor as for anyone
else.
Before explaining the basis for this view, it might be of
interest to set forth what is understood to be Johnston's proposal
for reconstituting the wage board:
1. The board would be reconstituted as an eighteen-man
tripartite board.
2. The new board would adopt and administer wage stabilization rules and regulations, subject to policy review by Johnston's
office.
3. The new board would be granted the power (not previously within its authority) to hear and adjudicate labor disputes
where the parties agree to submit the dispute and be bound by the
decision.
4. The new board would be granted power to hear and
adjudicate any dispute certified by the President as affecting the
national defense program.
VI.

DISCUSSION OF PROPOSAL

Item 1. The Eighteen-Man Board. There appears to be no
objection to doubling the size of the board, which would not alter
its tripartite character, although this is the first time on record
when anyone has suggested that the way to solve a problem is to
multiply it by two. It is unfortunate that the tripartite arrangement has not been abandoned since it has already proved unworkable as an instrument for wage control. In opposing a
tripartite board, I wish to make it clear that my purpose is not
to freeze out labor from the defense program. I believe that
labor's cooperation is essential and that labor should be given
a real voice in defense mobilization. For example, I would
approve an advisory committee on wage stabilization composed
of labor and industry representatives, and I would urge the Admin-
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istration to consult it frequently and place careful heed to its
views. But, where the actual making and enforcement of policy
is concerned, I firmly believe this should be done by persons
representing the public, who are not subject to pressures and
influence from any special group. I would exclude industry as
well as labor from the policy-making authority.
Item 2. The Administration of Wage and Salary Controls.
This was, of course, the sole reason for the establishment of a
wage board, and there can be no objection to this proposal. It is
only to be hoped that the board will concentrate on the objective
and devise and enforce a workable wage policy.
Items 3 and 4. The Settlement of Wage and Other Labor
Disputes. This is the real joker in the Johnston proposal. If this
proposal is adopted, and it now appears that it will be, we may
as well abandon what little hope we have of getting effective
wage control. And, not only that, it will forecast the end of
genuine collective bargaining and the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes. It will usher in through the back door a system
of compulsory arbitration which may well prove a permanent
part of our national life. Unions, no less than employers, should
abhor such a development.
I hope that you will not shrug off my alarm at these developments as mere rash predictions. There are many eminent experts
in this field who entertain the same fears. It is perfectly obvious
what will happen to wage control if the wage board is given the
power to settle wage disputes. By this, of course, I do not mean
disputes as to the application and interpretation of wage regulations and policies. This board already has and should continue
to have power to dispose of this kind of dispute. I am referring
now to disputes between an employer and a union as to whether
or not the employer should grant an increase which would be in
excess of what the regulations permit. The War Labor Board
handled such disputes during World War II, and the result was
continuous pressure applied in thousands of individual cases to
exceed the wage ceilings. Under such pressure, our experience
has proved beyond doubt that wage ceilings or formulae finally
bend and then break. It is impossible to hold any kind of firm
wage line if recognition is given to the right to constantly hammer
on a case-to-case basis at the wage ceilings.
The fact is that, if we seriously intend to hold a line on
wages, we must first decide upon a fair and reasonable formula,
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whether ten per cent or fifteen per cent, and then we must have
the guts to say "no" to any efforts to break the dike, however
determined and widespread they may become. If it is known that
the government means business about holding the line on wages,
unions and employees will learn to accept the situation, and it
will be possible through collective bargaining to reach settlement
within the ceilings. But, if there is provided a forum for seeking
approval of increases in excess of ceilings, the unions and employers will either (1) make settlements for more than the ceilings
provide, and petition for board approval, or (2) if the employer
will not agree, the union will take the case to the board as a
dispute. In either event, wage control will eventually become
a nullity.
In short, therefore, I believe that the granting to the board
of the power to decide wage disputes, involving the question of
how much of an increase the employer should grant, will divert
the board from its function as a stabilizer of wages and pervert
it into an instrument for pushing wage ceilings higher and
higher by compulsory means. If this is done, price ceilings will
also be broken, and runaway inflation will be the result.
This is not all. Under the Johnston proposal, as I am given
to understand, the new wage board would also be given the power
to decide non-monetary disputes such as union security, management prerogatives, seniority, disciplinary rules, vacation, and the
like.
At the outset, speaking as a lawyer, I seriously question
whether the President has the authority to give any such power
to the wage board. Title V of the Defense Production Act states
that the national policy shall be "to place primary reliance upon
the parties to any labor dispute to make every effort through
negotiation and collective bargaining and the full use of mediation
and conciliation facilities to effect a settlement in the national
interest." It might be possible to meet this requirement by providing that no dispute should be submitted to the board until
all voluntary means of settlement have been exhausted. However, this same title of the act further states that, before procedures
for settling labor disputes are established by the President, he
shall call a conference of management, labor and the public and
that he shall take such action as agreed upon by such conference.
This seems to contemplate that the holding of such a conference
is a condition precedent to the establishment of disputes settlement
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machinery, and, moreover, that there must be agreement on the
course to be followed. No such conference has yet been called.
Legal objections aside, however, my fundamental quarrel
with the proposal is that our experience in World War II demonstrated conclusively, in my opinion, that, where government provides a board to settle disputes, the result is compulsory arbitration,
and collective bargaining goes out the window. And, if we
voluntarily discard the democratic process of free collective bargaining between management and labor for a system of government arbitration, we will be giving up a fundamental freedom
which may not be restored during our lifetime. This emergency,
according to many responsible officials, may last for many, many
years, and all our citizens who believe in democracy should hesitate
to subscribe to a course which would turn over to the government
the settlement of disputes which are now being worked out at the
plant level by the give and take of collective bargaining between
the employer and the union representing his employees.
It will do no good to provide that a dispute cannot go to the
board until collective bargaining has been exhausted. Again,
experience has shown that, if there exists a governmental forum
for airing disputes, there is always the possibility that employees
can obtain from the government board more than they can secure
by negotiation. On the opposite end of the stick, employers will
hold back something in order to improve their position before the
board. That being true, collective bargaining is exhausted quickly
without really being given a chance to succeed, and the board is
deluged with literally thousands of disputes. Collective bargaining
then becomes a sham as our World War II experience under the
War Labor Board so clearly shows.
We should not overlook the fact that we are by no means
helpless now to handle labor disputes and even strikes that might
threaten our defense program. The National Labor Relations
Board has long had procedures for settling disputes relating to
representation rights and unfair labor practice, and it now has
the authority to enjoin certain illegal boycotts and strikes. We
have the process of collective bargaining which has been highly
successful, for we must remember that it is only in the rare case
that collective bargaining fails. We have voluntary arbitration
under many union contracts, and we have a Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service if an impasse in bargaining is reached. And,
if all these fail as they sometimes do, we have the emergency pro-
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visions of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which have been
invoked in strikes of great national importance. Most of our serious
strikes have affected an industry or at least a substantial part of
an industry, and it is this type of strike that we have most to fear.
If such strikes occur, the emergency provisions of the LaborManagement Relations Act are available and should be invoked
rather than by-passed by the establishment of a national arbitration board. If the emergency provisions of the Labor-Management
Relations Act are not adequate or if they are unfair, they should
be changed, but we should not trade them for compulsory
arbitration by government decree.
All of these procedures exist alongside of, and are compatible
with, the continued functioning of collective bargaining and the
other voluntary means of settling disputes. Government arbitration is not. They are also compatible with a large degree of
industrial freedom for employers and unions alike, and arbitration
by a government board is not. If we value this freedom, as I
know we all do, we should not relinquish it so lightly for the
superficial advantages of a governmental agency for settling
disputes.
VII. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Since I have been rather critical of apparent administration
proposals for reconstituting the Wage Stabilization Board, I should
perhaps state briefly my own affirmative views. In this, I do not
wish to appear presumptuous, but merely to set forth an alternative proposal for purposes of comparison. In my opinion, the
first and primary job of the Wage Stabilization Board should be
to hold the line on wages. I recognize, of course, that there is
a direct relationship between wages and prices, and also that we
cannot expect labor to go along with rigid wage control while
we are following a liberal policy on prices. However, I am
certain that we cannot enforce any kind of wage control, if we
start out with an administrative setup and with policies which,
by their very nature, make effective control difficult to the point
of being well-nigh impossible.
I believe as a citizen that inflation is our greatest threatapart from Communism itself-and that we must all-including
industry and labor-be willing to tighten our belts and make real
sacrifices. This means that we must be prepared to accept price
and wage controls even where it hurts-not just for everybody
else-but for ourselves as well. Therefore, I favor a stern price
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and wage policy, and I believe that this is also the view of the
great majority of the American people. If such is to be the
policy, it will pinch many employers and many more wage
earners. The pressure to relax the controls will come from many
sources, and it will be continuous and strong. Consequently, if
price and wage controls are to work, they must also be administered
with a hard heart and a strong hand. I do not believe that a
tripartite board is the proper instrument' for either forging or
enforcing wage policy any more than it would be appropriate
for administering price control.
I would like to suggest the following approach:
1. A strong policy toward price control, including holding
the present line and even rolling back some commodity prices.
2. Abolition of the tripartite wage board, and appointment
of a single administrator over wages.
3. Establishment of a clear cut wage policy, and strict adherence to that policy. The administrator would have no authority over disputes, either wage disputes or otherwise. The administrator would, of course, have the power to revise the wage regulations, or interpret the regulations, but he would not entertain
any petitions to lift the ceilings in particular cases, except where
the case fell within certain recognized exceptions, such as individual hardship cases. Any change in policy should be general in
application and not confined to particular parties or cases.
4. The wage regulations should be simple and understandable, and parties should be prohibited from making any agree.
ment for an increase in excess of the regulation. By the same
token, it should be made unlawful to strike for increases beyond
what is permitted by the regulations. This would, in effect, be a
strike against the government.
5. Employers should support the wage policy by refusing to
agree to excessive wage increases for the purpose of submitting
them to the board for approval. This is unfair to the wage
administrator and makes effective wage control extremely difficult.
6. Labor disputes should continue to be handled by collective bargaining, conciliation and voluntary arbitration, with recourse to the emergency provisions of the existing law only in
event of strikes endangering the national health, walfare or safety.
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